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Two-Part Tax Controls for Forest Density and Rotation Time 
 
 
Many forest amenities are derived not only from the age of the trees, but also from the 
density of the trees.  When an externality such as erosion control is considered, clear-cutting 
results in much larger damages than occur with selective cutting.  This paper extends current 
methodology, allowing firms to optimize over both rotation time and the commercial use 
percentage per acre.  A two-part instrument, a “clear-cut” tax combined with a lump sum 
“licensing fee”, controls for commercial use percentage and rotation time in a firm that does not 
internalize non-timber benefits.  Optimal taxes are presented that correct the firm’s suboptimal 
behavior.  A two-part instrument is shown to remedy market failure when a private firm clear-
cuts and harvests too soon, and when an overgrown forest is not privately optimal to maintain.  
Numerical analysis on a simple case, simulating a forest where the externality is erosion control 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper extends current literature of public policy on forestry by allowing the forest 
planner and private landowner to choose not only the rotation time, but also what portion of each 
acre will be used commercially.
1  Many forest amenities are derived not only from the age of the 
trees, but also from the density of the trees.  In the case of some forest externalities such as 
erosion control, it is possible that the clear-cutting of a forest might result in much larger 
damages than would occur with selective cutting.  
   The regulation of the commercial use percentage per acre may dampen the externalities 
associated with clear-cutting and thus avert such disasters as the one experienced in Portland, 
Oregon in 1995. Massive landslides, occurring mostly in areas of clear-cutting, contaminated the 
entire city’s water supply and caused millions of dollars of damage.  The damage was so great 
that in a recent election, Oregonians were asked to vote on a referendum that would have banned 
clear-cutting completely.  Regulating the commercial use percentage per acre may also dampen 
the externalities associated with letting a forest grow unchecked. The immense, costly forest fires 
occurring all over the Western U.S. in 2002 make it obvious that letting forests grow without 
management can be as bad as clear-cutting.  Therefore, on forestlands that are in danger of 
falling victim to a wildfire and would not otherwise be logged, it may be prudent to provide a 
firm with incentive to harvest some percentage significantly greater than zero.  In either case, the 
consideration of commercial use percentage is an important part of forest management and has 
been ignored by the forest economics literature thus far.         4
This paper focuses on two cases, one where a logging firm does not internalize the benefits 
from leaving some trees uncut and therefore chooses to clear-cut and the second where the forest 
in question is unprofitable to harvest and has become over grown.  A pair of taxes is presented 
that, used in combination with one another, optimally control for clear-cutting rather than 
banning it completely.  Furthermore, the same instruments can be used to induce the optimal 
behavior when it is socially optimal to harvest a forest, to prevent forest fires for example, but it 
is not privately optimal. 
Section 2 of this paper briefly revisits the basic Faustmann and Hartman models of optimal 
forest management, then introduces a new model that allows a social planner to choose both the 
optimal rotation period and the optimal amount of each acre to use commercially.   Section 3 sets 
up the private landowner’s problem and includes taxes aimed at controlling both rotation time 
and percentage commercial use.  Solutions are presented for the social and private problems,  as 
well as the solutions for the optimal tax instruments.   Section 4 shows the results of a numerical 
analysis on a simple stylized case.  
 
2.  FAUSTMANN, HARTMAN, AND BEYOND 
 
Before jumping into a more general model, this section presents a brief overview of the 
classic Faustmann and Hartman models.  
  
The Faustmann Model 
The Faustmann model solves for the optimal rotation period of a forest that will be harvested 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 Commercial use percentage, as will be discussed in detail later in the paper, means the amount of each acre a firm 
will choose strictly for its commercial value.  A firm will choose this portion of each acre ex ante for all periods.    5
forever. Initially, the land is bare with timber production as its only use.  The landowner chooses 
the rotation period  T  to maximize the following private value function: 
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where G(T)  is the net timber value of the stand at time  T.  The numerator is the present net 
value of the stand that will be harvested at  T .  The denominator is simply the result of summing 
over an infinite series of identical rotations.  
 
Taking the derivative with respect to the rotation length and rearranging, the following first 
order condition is derived: 
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where the left hand side of the equation is the growth rate of the forest in terms of net value.  So 
a rational landowner will cut down all the trees and replant when the growth rate equals the 
interest rate multiplied by a discount factor. 
 
Hartman:  Forest Planner Problem, Externalities Included 
Following Hartman (1976), an externalities function that varies with the age of the forest is 
introduced into the forest planner’s problem.  The social value (SV) function can now be written 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The trees that are not part of the commercial use portion of each acre will never be harvested.      6
the following way: 
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where  G(T)  is again the net timber value at age  T ,  r  is the interest rate, and  F(t)  is a function 
giving the externalities generated by the forest at each point in time.  The integral gives the 
present value of a stream of non-timber benefits coming from the standing forest.  Thus SV(T) 
describes society’s total benefit from the forest, summed over an infinite series of rotations of 
length  T. 
The time path of the benefits flowing from a standing forest is controversial. Hartman (1976), 
Strang (1983), Snyder and Bhattacharyya (1990), Max and Lehman (1988),and Reed (1984), 
assume  F(t)  increases with the age of the trees at a decreasing rate.  If this is the case, the 
externality function is monotonically increasing, and it is always optimal, disregarding the timber 
value, to let the forest grow.  Even though this case may be the most likely, it is not the most 
general case.  Calish et. al. (1978) show that, depending on the forest, the externality function 
could take any number of shapes, including a non-monotonic one. Englin and Klan (1990) 
assume only that  F(t)  is either increasing at a decreasing rate or increasing and then, at some 
point, decreasing.  In this case, the externality function, at some time  tFmax,  begins to decrease 
and it is optimal (again disregarding timber value) to harvest the forest at some time less than 
infinity.  Therefore, conceptually, the externality may “favor” either older trees or younger trees.  
This paper follows Englin and Klan’s model in this regard. 
Maximizing equation (3) with respect to the rotation length and rearranging, the first order   7
condition can be written as: 
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The social planner will allow cutting when the growth rate of the forest in net timber value is 
equal to a discount factor plus the “externalities balance”, as dubbed by Englin and Klan (1990), 
divided by  G(T), the timber value at  T. 
3  Think of the externalities balance as the present value 
of the difference between the forest benefits available at the end of the rotation period,  F(T) , 
and the stream of benefits available from the growing forest throughout the rotation period.   
Whether the optimal rotation time is shorter or longer than it would be without externalities 
depends on the sign of the second term on the right hand side.  Furthermore, the sign of this term 
depends on the time path of the externality function.  The externality, or amenity, favors old trees 
for example, when there is a positive difference between the amenity value at  T  and the amenity 
value at  t, for all  t, summed over the rotation period. This paper examines two cases.  In the first 
case, it is assumed that for all t < T, F(T) >F(t).  This implies that consideration of the externality 
increases the optimal rotation time.  This would be the case if the amenity were erosions control.  
In the second case, analogous to a fire prevention amenity, F(t)>F(T) for some or all t, such that 
the sum of the differences, the externalities balance, over the optimal rotation period is negative.  
This implies that consideration of the amenity decreases the optimal rotation time.    
                                                           
2 The second order condition can be written as:    
• • • •
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3 Note, at this point, as in previous literature, clear-cutting is assumed.   8
The private landowner who does not internalize the externality will not choose the socially 
optimal rotation period.  Thus the need for corrective regulation or tax instruments arises.   
 
Allowing for Choice in Percent Commercial Use and Rotation Timing 
To capture the effects of the density of trees left standing, as well as the rotation period on 
forest amenities, two major features are added to the previous model.  First the forest planner or 
the private landowner chooses not only when to cut, but also what percentage per acre to use 
commercially.  This additional choice is important, since many forest amenities such as erosion 
control are directly related to the remaining density of the forest.  It may not be optimal to let the 
external benefit reach zero, as might be the case with a clear-cut.  This is especially true when 
the positive externality is control of a potential disaster, such as a flood, massive erosion, or fire.  
The firm in this case, before harvesting the first rotation, chooses once and for all what 
percentage of each acre of forest to use commercial harvest.
4  The remaining trees, the ones not 
within the commercial portion of each acre, are “tagged” to remain uncut for as long as they 
live.
5,6   Second, the externality function and the private gross revenues and costs, the timber 
value of the forest, are allowed to be functions of the percentage commercial use, as well as the 
forest’s age.   
The forest planner again maximizes the sum of the timber and non-timber benefits of the 
                                                           
4 Interesting papers have been written addressing optimal forest thinning (Cawrse, et al (1984), Betters et. al. 
(1991)).  The choice of commercial use percentage is not identical to the thinning choice, however.  Because we are 
concerned primarily with externalities associated with clear cuts, this paper focuses on controlling the timing and the 
number of trees cut during the final harvest decision.  For simplicity and to center attention on the final harvesting 
decision, within rotation thinning decisions on the commercial portion of the forest are left out of the model.    
5 The trees may be left in different patterns depending on the externality in question.  For instance, if the externality 
is silt flow into a salmon habitat, a band of trees never-cut lining separating the stream and the commercially 
harvested portion of the land would be desirable.  If the externality is erosion on the side of a hill, fire control, or 
viewing pleasure, the trees left uncut might be spread evenly throughout each acre.    
6 This restriction, that trees that are not harvested in the first period are left uncut once and for all, implies that the 
commercial use portion of the forest can be modeled as an even age forest.     9
forest over an infinite number of identical rotations. The value function can be written as 
follows: 
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Note the difference between this expression and equation (4).  Now the forest externality is 
both a function of age  t  and the commercial use percentage per acre PC. 
7  With respect to PC, 
the path of F(t, PC), either decreases monotonically with the commercial percentage per acre, as 
would be the case if the amenity were erosion control, or follows an inverted “U’ shape, as 
would be the case if the amenity were fire control.  The net timber value, G(T, PC),  is an 
increasing function of both  T  and  PC.  Since the forest planner must now make two choices, the 
optimization problem produces two first order conditions:  one describing the optimal rotation 
time and the other describing the optimal percentage of commercial use per acre.  These first 
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Equation (6) gives the conditions for optimal rotation time given a certain commercial 
percentage per acre.  The social planner will allow harvest when the growth rate of the forest in 
net timber value is equal to a discount factor plus the externalities balance divided by the timber 
value at T and harvesting fraction  PC. 
Equation (7) gives the first order condition for the optimal percentage of commercial use per 
acre given a certain rotation period.  The social planner will choose  PC such that the marginal 
net timber value with respect to  PC  is equal to the marginal value of the lost forest amenity with 
respect to  PC.  Intuitively, the social benefits of a marginal increase in PC, derived from an 
increased amount of timber harvested, must equal the social costs of a marginal increase in  PC, 
derived from a decrease in the amenity value of the standing forest.  By definition, the timber 
value of the forest is increasing in  PC.  Therefore, the social planner must choose a percentage 
commercial use such that the amenity value of the forest is marginally decreasing.  An internal 
solution to the problem requires that  F(t, PC)  be decreasing in  PC, but monotonicity is not 
necessary.  Nonmonotonicity in  PC  may occur if the amenity is fire prevention.  
 
3.  PRIVATE OPTIMIZATION, TAXATION, AND SOCIALLY OPTIMAL OUTCOMES 
 
This section examines the private logging firm’s problem, where the firm faces taxes aimed 
at controlling both the percentage of commercial use on each acre and rotation time.  If feasible 
to implement, a Pigovian tax or subsidy on the externality would directly force the firm to 
internalize the externality and could induce optimal behavior in both choices.  However, a 
Pigovian tax or subsidy is not feasible in this case.  If the externality in question were erosion 
control for example, a tax on the units of dirt that travel from one acre to the next, or into a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7  By definition, 0 ≥ PC ≥ 1.   PC  = 1 would be a clear-cut.   11
stream, may be unrealistic.  The observation of such an externality and enforcement of the tax 
would be very difficult, if not impossible. 
Since the firm can choose both the rotation period and the commercial use percentage, and a 
Pigovian subsidy is unrealistic, a single instrument cannot control both choices.  An alternative is 
to tax the market transactions and suboptimal behavior of which the externality is a symptom. 
This section analyzes the case where the clear-cut tax, combined with the licensing fee can 
correct the market failure in two general cases:  one where the logging firm clear-cuts and 
harvests sooner than socially optimal, and one where the it is socially optimal to harvest a forest, 
to prevent forest fires for example, but it is not privately optimal.  Solutions for the optimal 
commercial use percentage and rotation time are presented, then analyzed through comparative 
statics to characterize the effects of the two-part tax.  Finally, this section solves for the optimal 
rates of tax and analyzes the proper application of the tax instrument to forests with different 
growth and externality characteristics.  
Consider two tax instruments: a flat, lump sum licensing fee (τ
LS), collected at harvest time
8 
and a “clear-cut” tax (τ
CC),
 levied on the firm’s fraction of commercial use per acre.
9  T h e  
number of trees that can be planted on an acre is assumed to be fixed.
10  Although not a tax on a 
direct market transaction, and therefore having some observation and enforcement issues, the 
clear-cut tax is simpler to implement than the Pigovian tax.  Enforcing the tax will require a 
                                                           
8 To control for rotation period alone, Englin and Klan (1990) suggest the use of existing tax instruments such as a 
property tax, a severance tax, or a yield tax.  While these existing, market based instruments are interesting, intuitive 
tools that can be used to correct for a sub-optimal rotation period, they do not work in combination with the clear-cut 
tax to correct for both commercial use percentage and rotation time.      
9 τ
CC  is different from a yield tax levied on the harvest revenue, or a unit tax levied on the timber volume of the 
harvest, as discussed in (Englin and Klan (1990), Koskela and Ollikainen, (2001), (2003)), as it is a tax on the 
percentage of each forested land unit allocated by the land owner as commercially harvested.  Though a graduated 
per acre unit tax would work in a similar fashion, the “clear-cut” tax allows the forest planner a flexible way to more 
directly address the issue of post harvest forest density.       12
record from each site of what percentage of each acre the firm leaves uncut and assurance that 
trees chosen for their amenity value, that is the trees not part of the commercial use portion of the 
land, remain uncut.   
   
 
 Private Optimization (All Taxes Included) 
For clarity of presentation, it is useful to define some functions:  
 
      ) ( ) ( ) ( t g t n t b =       ( 8 )  
 
where n(t)  is the number of trees,  g(t)  is the timber volume of a tree at any given time.  Thus  
b(t) can be interpreted as the timber volume of the growing trees in the stand at any given time.  
The timber volume is assumed to be monotonically increasing for all  t.  Although the number of 
trees will decrease over time, each tree grows fast enough keep the volume of timber increasing.  
To implement the taxes properly, the timber value of the forest,  G(T,PC), must be more 
clearly defined.  Let it be broken down into net revenues and costs so that  G(T,PC) = pPC b(T) -
c, where p  is the price of timber, net of unitary harvest costs, and  c  is the fixed harvest and 
replant cost, a weakly increasing function of  PC.
11  The large lump sum costs of harvest that a 
firm must pay each period for capital and labor are captured by  c.  The intuition is that firms 
must rent a certain amount of equipment and labor to harvest each acre regardless of the 
commercial use percentage.  Incidental marginal costs are captured in  p.   The term  pPCb(T)   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
10 The policy maker would have to consider the species of tree being planted.  A different number of trees could be 
planted per acre, depending on the species.  Furthermore, different forest types will have a different optimal 
percentage of uncut trees. 
11 This method to define G(T, PC) loosely follows Englin and Klan (1990).   13
can be interpreted as the value of the growing trees at time  T.   Now it is possible to define the 
firm’s profit function, net of taxes, at the time of harvest: 
 
    ) ( ) ( ) , ( C
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The actual penalty incurred from the clear-cut tax is the tax rate, τ
CC , multiplied by θ(PC),  
an increasing, convex function of  PC.
12  This allows the instrument to take the form of a 
continuously graduated tax if desired by the planner.    
The private landowner chooses  T  and  PC  to maximize the following value function:   
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Notice that the private firm does not internalize the externality.  The left-hand side of the 
equation simply reflects the fact that the private value function depends on  T  and  PC. 
Maximizing over the rotation period and percentage commercial use yields the following first 
order conditions: 
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12 Alternatively,  τ
CC  could be multiplied by Γ(PC),  a decreasing, concave function of  PC.  If this were the case,  τ
CC  
could take the form of a subsidy.  The subsidy would decrease in  PC  and could entice a firm choose the optimal 
percentage commercial use per acre.  For the purposes of this paper, I analyze only the most intuitive case where τ
CC 
is an increasing penalty on  PC.     14
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Equation (11) shows the firm will harvest when the benefit of a marginal increase in  T  
equals the discounted net profit gained by harvesting at time  T.  If   pPCb(T) < c, the firm will 
never harvest unless subsidized.  Equation (12) shows the firm will choose  PC  such that the net 
gains in increasing  the commercial use percentage equals zero.  With fixed costs and no taxes 
the firm will arrive at a corner solution, where  PC = 1.          
Plugging the profit function and the proper partial derivates into 11 and 12 yields: 
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The intuition for equations (13) and (14) are similar to the previous two equations, though it 
is clear now, from equation (14) that with constant costs and no tax, an internal solution for PC  
does not exist.     
 
The Growth Function, Externalities, and the Effect of Clear-cutting:  Two Cases 
Before launching into analysis of the implementation of clear-cut tax, lump sum licensing fee 
combination, it will be helpful again to examine the possible forest characteristics that might 
influence the optimal tax combinations as well as the magnitude of their actual effect..   15
Case 1:  Before the planner arrives, the private landowner is clear-cutting and harvesting the 
trees sooner each period than is optimal.  No prior restrictions are made on the magnitude of the 
effects of  PC  and  T  on the externality, only on the sign.  In this case, F(t,PC) is strictly 
increasing over T, for all t<T, and strictly decreasing in PC.   PC  may  have a large effect on the 
externality in question, as it would be in the case of erosion control on a steep slope, or in the 
preservation of a species habitat. Or the effect may be a small one, as might be the case if the 
forest is used for hiking. Furthermore, no assumption is made as to the rate of growth of the 
forest.   
Case 2:  The forest in question is unprofitable to harvest and has become over grown.  In this 
case, the forest planner must induce harvest to decrease an externality, such as fire risk, 
associated with too many trees on each acre.  Positive PC  now acts a fire inhibitor.  The 
externality thus takes an inverse U shape in  PC .  Over a relatively low commercial percentage 
per acre chosen, the amenity is increasing.  More trees harvested lead to greater fire prevention.  
However, over a relatively high  PC  the amenity is decreasing.  So the forest planner wants to 
induce some harvest, but a clear-cut still does not maximize the amenity value.  This would be 
the fairly general case under decreasing marginal amenity returns or where there are multiple 
amenities, such as erosion control, scenery, and existence value, besides fire control, that are 
increasing in  PC.
13  Further, the externality favors younger trees, that is  F(t,PC)  is decreasing 
for some or all  t  such that the externalities balance is positive. As in the first case no prior 
restrictions are made on the magnitude of the effects of  PC  and  T, or the growth rate of the 
forest.  
Thus, the following section shows how the two-part instrument can be used to increase or   16
decrease a firm’s commercial use percentage and rotation period under fairly general conditions.                 
 
Two Part Instrument: Clear-cut and Lump Sum Licensing Fee 
Differentiating equation (13) with respect to  τ
LS  yields the effect of the yield tax on the 
optimal private rotation period:    
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Differentiating equation (13) with respect to  τ
CC  yields the effect of the clear-cut tax on T*:   
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A positive lump sum tax lengthens the rotation period.  With a lump sum licensing fee paid 
every rotation, the competitive private owner must let the trees mature longer in order to 
maximize profits.  The effect of the clear-cut tax on  T*  is the present value of the marginal clear 
cut tax penalty. This is unambiguously positive.  When a logging company is persuaded to 
harvest fewer trees than is privately optimal, it must let the trees grow longer to maximize 
profits.  Since both taxes serve to lengthen the optimal rotation period, the effect of the two-part 
instrument, where both taxes are positive, is to unambiguously lengthen rotation time. It is also 
possible that a properly set subsidy tax instrument could be used to arrive at the optimal  T.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 Of course if the threat of fire were severe enough to outweigh the marginal alternate amenity value of even the last 
tree,  F(t, PC) would be monotonically increasing in  PC.  In this case, the result is a corner solution.  The forest 
planner subsidizes the firm to induce profits ≥ 0, and sets  τ
CC = 0, allowing a clear-cut.   17
 
Differentiating equation (14) with respect to  τ
LS  yields the effect of the lump sum licensing 
fee on PC*:    
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Differentiating equation (14) with respect to  τ
CC  yields the effect of the clear-cut tax on 
PC*:   
      













     
 (18) 
 
The licensing fee has no effect on the optimal commercial use percentage.  This is expected.  
The licensing fee penalizes the firm a fixed amount every rotation, but does not penalize it based 
on how much of each acre it allocates for harvest.  Therefore the firm’s profit maximizing 
commercial use percentage is not influenced by the lump-sum licensing fee.
14  The effect of the 
clear-cut tax depends upon the marginal penalty received for cutting  PC.  Since by definition  
θ(PC) is increasing in  PC,  the tax decreases the optimal commercial use percentage.  Further, the 
net effect of the two-tax instrument on  PC  is negative when both taxes are positive.  The policy 
will always serves to decreases the optimal density of the harvest.   18
Note that while the clear-cut tax affects both  PC  and  T,  the licensing fee only affects  T.  
This is both an interesting and useful result.  A planner wanting to control for commercial 
harvest percentage can set  τ
CC  to arrive at the optimal  PC, then use τ
LS  to fine tune the timing 
of each harvest.  If the effect of  PC  on the externality is sufficiently large to produce the need 
for a large clear-cut tax, inducing an inefficiently long rotation period, τ
LS  can take the form of a 
subsidy to reduce the rotation period by the optimal amount.        
Setting private first–order conditions equal to social first-order conditions to solve for the 
optimal tax rates yields: 
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These tax rates make the private first order conditions match the socially optimal first order 
conditions.  From equation (7) we know the  social value function is maximized where F(t,PC) is 
decreasing in  PC, whether  F(t,PC) is monotonically decreasing in  PC   as in Case 1, or inverse U 
shaped in  PC  as in Case 2.  Thus, since the tax penalty is constant or graduated by definition,  
the optimal clear cut tax rate is positive in either case. The optimal tax rate increases as the effect 
of  PC  on the externality increases.  For example, if the externality were erosion control, the 
clear-cut tax would necessarily be higher for firms harvesting on sloped landscapes, or above a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
14 This is true only when there is an interior solution for the maximization problem relative to rotation time.  If the 
forest is unprofitable to the private firm, a lump sum subsidy could be used to induce harvest of  PC >0.  However,   19
populated area or water source.  Intuitively, the clear-cut tax rate decreases as the tax penalty 
becomes increasingly graduated. 
The sign and magnitude of the lump sum licensing fee depends upon the growth rate of the 
value of the externality and  τ
CC.   The lump sum fee is positive if: 
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In Case 1, F(t,PC) is strictly increasing over T, for all t<T, so the externalities balance is 
negative.  Therefore the optimal licensing fee is negative and takes the form of a subsidy.   If the 
value of the externality grows slowly throughout the rotation, the lump sum subsidy will be 
larger.  Furthermore, if the social value of the forest is very sensitive to the density of the trees, 
requiring a large clear-cut tax, the planner will need to pay a larger subsidy.  A large τ
CC  may 
give the firm incentive to wait longer to harvest than is optimal.  The proper lump sum subsidy 
corrects this inefficiency. 
In Case 2,  the amenity is fire control, so  F(t,PC)  is decreasing over all or some of   t<T, 
such that the externalities balance is positive.  Thus it seems possible that equations (21) and (22) 
could hold.  However, since the planner is attempting to induce harvest in an otherwise 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
once the firm decides to harvest,  the lump sum fee cannot control  PC.   20
unprofitable forest, the lump sum transfer must be a subsidy.  Though  F(t,PC)  is inverse U 
shaped in  PC,  equation (7), as discussed above, shows that the forest planner must choose a 
percentage commercial use on the decreasing part of the amenity function.  If the fire control 
amenity is more sensitive to the age of the forest, rather the density, the externalities balance will 
be relatively large, and  F(t,PC)  will begin decreasing in  PC  at a relatively low percentage 
commercial use.  In this case, the planner will offer the firm a large subsidy to induce shorter 
rotation period, but will also tax the percentage commercial use relatively heavily.  This results 
in more never-cut trees, with less time between “maintenance” harvests.  If the fire control 
amenity is more sensitive to the density of the forest, rather than the age, the externalities balance 
will be smaller, and  F(t,PC)  will begin decreasing in  PC  at a relatively high percentage 
commercial use per acre.  In this case, the planner will offer the firm a smaller subsidy to induce 
harvest, but will also tax the percentage commercial use less heavily.  This will result in more 
trees per acre cleared during harvest, but with slightly longer rotations.                
In summary, the clear-cut tax affects both commercial use percentage per acre and rotation 
timing.  However, in all except a unique case, the tax causes the firm’s rotation period to be too 
short or too long.  Furthermore, the clear-cut tax cannot induce harvest when the forest is not 
privately profitable.  Therefore the second part of the two-part instrument, the lump sum 
licensing subsidy, is needed to correct for the inefficient rotation period.   
         
4.  A SIMPLE NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
 
So far the model has been very general and has been applicable to a wide range of cases.   A 
numerical model will illustrate what the optimal tax rates are under different conditions. This   21
section describes one very simple, but intuitive stylized example where the clear-cut tax and 
lump sum tax are implemented. 
In the numerical example, a specific form for the externality function,  F(PC,T) is assumed.  
The function below shows the instantaneous value of the amenity for any  PC  and  t: 
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where  γ  is the dollar value per volume unit of the amenity.  The first group of terms on the right 
hand side of the equation can be interpreted as the amenity value of the trees that have been left 
uncut and have reached peak volume.  The second group of terms is the amenity value of the 
growing trees that have been replanted since the previous harvest.  Squaring the harvest fraction 
puts more weight on the value of the fully-grown trees.  This approximates the case where the 
concern is soil erosion.  As the commercial use portion of the forest regrows, the new trees will 
develop root systems and eventually aid in the reduction of erosion.  However, since trees are 
typically harvested long before they are full grown, it is the uncut trees with fully developed root 
systems that will produce the most erosion control. 
For simplicity,  p  is assumed to be net of all costs.  
Under these assumptions, the first order conditions for a social optimum become: 
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The first order condition for the optimal rotation period depends linearly on γ  and  PC, and  
PC  depends inversely on  γ.  Plugging  the condition for optimal percentage commercial use into 
equation (24) shows that the optimal rotation period does not depend on  γ: 
 








































For any given  PC,  γ  increases the optimal rotation period.  However,  γ   also decreases the 
optimal  PC.  These effects cancel out exactly and the optimal  T  is left unaffected by  γ.   The 
tax on the commercial use fraction will not affect the firm’s decision on rotation length.  
From equation (25), it is apparent that an internal solution, 0 <  PC < 1, will exist if: 
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This is true for a sufficiently small  p  or  sufficiently large  γ.  There exists an internal 
solution as long as the ratio of marginal timber value to marginal amenity value is sufficiently 
small.  
The clear-cut tax is equal to the square of PC: θ(PC)= PC
2.  This penalizes the firm relatively 
more for a commercial use percentage closer to 100%.  This reflects the idea that the planner is   23
more concerned with reducing the amount of clear-cutting and cares less about a marginal 
change in the number of trees cut if the firm harvests as low fraction. 
The stylized function used for the biomass of trees in board feet,  b(T), is based on data 
published by Richard McArdle (1961)  for the Douglas Fir.
15  The estimated function shown is:  
 




= T b        ( 2 8 )  
 
The function is plotted in Figure I.  The biomass of this particular stand peaks at 25,000 
board feet per acre and reaches this peak at a stand age of 70 years.
16     
 
The price of a board foot is taken from Calish et. al. (1978) and transformed into year 2000 
dollars.  In the model  p =  2.03. 
 
The model is implemented in the Ox programming language developed by Doornick (1999).  
T   and  PC  are solved simultaneously based on the estimated parameters.  When the real interest 
rate is assumed to be 3% and  γ  is assumed equal to $0.02, the Faustmann optimal rotation 
period, not considering the externality, is 41.6 years.
17  If the externality is considered, the 
optimal rotation period is 42.4 years and the optimal commercial harvest per acre is 55%.  The 
optimal clear-cut tax is $37,444 per square fraction of each acre for a total penalty of $11,327 per 
                                                           
15 The MacArdle data counts the amount of wood available from root to tip of each tree.  Although a good estimate 
of the wood available to a pulp and paper firm, it does not provide an estimate of the wood available to be used as 
lumber.  Thus, using the MacArdle data as a reference, the “stylized” biomass estimation captures roughly the 
growth in mass of the wood available for lumber.    
16 Obviously, trees will continue to grow past 70 years, but this model assumes that the wood useable for lumber 
will reach near maximum volume by 70 years. 
17 This is a point of reference only.  In reality, as in the rest of the analysis, these values will vary.   24
acre.  The optimal lump sum payment per rotation period is a subsidy of $8,891.  Before taxes, 
the firm makes a gross profit of $22,822 per acre.  The firm makes an after tax net profit of   
$20,302 per acre. 
As predicted by the general theoretical model, it is possible, if not likely, that the lump sum 
licensing fee will take the form of a subsidy in order to correct for the heavy clear-cut tax 
necessary to reach the optimal percentage commercial use per acre.  In the case above, the firm is 
charged a clear-cut penalty that is nearly half of their gross margins on timber.  Furthermore, the 
firm is harvesting half of the lumber it would harvest in the absence of the tax.  Therefore, to 
reach the optimal rotation time and make up for the clear-cut penalty that induces the optimal 
harvest percentage but misses the optimal rotation time, the firm must be subsidized each 
rotation period. 
To better illustrate this point, the model is run under the previous parameter settings with the 
tax rates held constant at incorrect values.  The lump sum tax is set to zero and the clear-cut tax 
rate is held at what optimal in the previous example ($37,444 per acre).  Under this tax schedule, 
the firm will choose a rotation period of 46 years and a harvest percentage of 61%.  The firm lets 
the trees grow for four years longer than is socially optimal, and because of the longer rotation 
period, the firm harvests 11% more trees than is socially optimal in order to maximize net 
profits.  Without the corrective lump sum subsidy, the logging firm will harvest too much, too 
late.  
To evaluate the sensitivity of the model to the assumptions about r and γ, the model is run 
with a range of values for these parameters.  The effects of changing the discount rate, holding  γ  
constant, on the optimal rotation period and harvest percentage are shown in Figure II.  As 
shown in the figure, the optimal commercial use percentage decreases fairly rapidly as the   25
discount rate increases. If the discount rate is high, the present value of the amenities a tree 
generates (which begin flowing immediately) will outweigh the present value of harvesting the 
tree at the end of each period.  The amenity is worth relatively more when the discount rate is 
higher.   Although  T  is not affected by the externality, it is affected by the discount rate.  It is 
apparent from Figure II that the higher the discount rate, the shorter the rotation period.   If the 
firm’s revenue stream is discounted at a higher rate, it will harvest sooner.  The decision of PC  
seems to be more sensitive to changes in the assumed discount rate than does the decision of the 
optimal rotation period.  With a discount rate of  7%, the optimal rotation period is 37.7 years 
and the optimal commercial use percentage is 18%.   Thus the optimal rotation period decreased 
less than 12% from the previous example, where r  = 3%, but the optimal commercial use 
percentage decreases by 37%.  
The effect of changing the marginal amenity value,  γ, holding  r  constant, on the optimal 
rotation period and commercial use percentage are shown in Figure III.  As predicted, the 
optimal rotation period is unaffected by the marginal value of the amenity.  The optimal  PC, 
decreases as  γ   gets larger.  As the units on x-axis double, the optimal  PC  decreases by one 
half.  There is a seemingly linear inverse relationship between commercial use percentage and 
marginal amenity value.  At  γ = $2.56/board foot, the optimal becomes no harvest at all.   This is 
analogous to the case where each tree cut might drastically increase the chance of a landslide or 
damaging erosion.  And although not shown on the figure, values of  γ  near $0.01 produce a 
corner solution , where it is best to clear-cut.  The marginal amenity value of each tree is so low 
that it is better to chop all of the trees down to reap the timber value. 
The different optimal tax rates for changing values of  r  and γ, are shown in Table I.  As 
expected, the clear-cut tax rate increases as the interest rate or γ  increases.  However, the actual   26
tax penalty, τ
CC* PC
 2, decreases.  This is due to the graduated nature of the tax.  Notice that in no 
case is the lump sum transfer positive.  In every non-corner solution case under the assumptions 
of this particular model, the dual tax instrument will take the form of a clear-cut and a lump sum 
licensing subsidy.  It is likely that a different set of assumptions on the functional form of the 
externality would yield different results.    
 
5.   CONCLUSIONS
 
The consideration of commercial use percentage introduces a formidable, interesting, and 
useful economic problem.  A two-part instrument, a clear-cut tax coupled with a lump sum 
subsidy can be used to remedy inefficiency where a valuable forest amenity is being negatively 
affected by a firm that is harvesting too many trees too fast.  Furthermore, the same instruments 
can be used to induce harvest when it is socially optimal to harvest a forest, but it is not privately 
optimal.  The taxes would be fairly easy to implement and could be used in a wide variety of real 
situations.     
The stylized numerical model shows the wide variety of conditions where the clear-cut tax 
and lump sum transfer could be used to achieve a socially optimal solution when the forest 
amenity is analogous to erosion control.  In the future, this model could be refined and expanded 
upon in many ways.  For example, it would be interesting to find numerical solutions for the 
social optimum under different amenity value functions.  Furthermore, interesting work has been 
done recently by Uusivuori and Kuuluvainen (2005)on multiple age forests.  Relaxing the never-
cut constraint would make this policy tool even more flexible and useful.       27
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Figure II: Optimal Rotation Periods and Commercial Use Percentages for 
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Figure III:  Optimal Rotation Periods and Commercial Use Percentages for 
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1% $22,944 $22,944 -$10,234 
2% $29,522 $16,166 -$10,539 
3% $37,444 $11,327 -$8,891 
4% $47,014 $8,293 -$6,946 
5% $58,534 $5,625 -$5,219 
6% $72,292 $4,164 -$3,832 
7% $88,541 $2,869 -$2,771 
8% $107,449 $2,106 -$1,982 
9% $129,030 $1,561 -$1,404 
10% $153,050 $980 -$986 








0.02 $37,443.75 $11,326.73 -$8,890.93 
0.04 $74,887.49 $5,871.18 -$4,445.47 
0.08 $149,774.98 $2,935.59 -$2,222.73 
0.32 $299,549.97 $1,467.79 -$1,111.37 
0.64 $599,099.94 $539.19 -$555.68 
1.28 $1,198,199.87 $479.28 -$277.84 
2.56 $2,396,399.74 $0.00 -$138.92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 